Abstract. We introduce a new cryptographic technique that we call universal re-encryption.
Introduction
A mix network or mixnet is a cryptographic construction that invokes a set of servers to create private communication channels. In general, a mix network accepts as input a collection of ciphertexts, and outputs associated plaintexts in a randomly permuted order. The special security property of a mix network is the secrecy it creates in the correspondence between inputs and outputs. In particular, a well constructed mix network makes it infeasible for an adversary to determine which input ciphertext corresponds to which output plaintext any more e ectively than by guessing at random. There are a number of forms of mix network. The type primarily considered in this paper, known as a re-encryption mixnet, takes as input a list of ciphertexts and outputs a list of corresponding re-encryptions of these ciphertexts { again, in a randomly permuted, secret order.
In previously proposed cryptosystems that permit re-encryption, a player wishing to re-encrypt a ciphertext requires knowledge of the corresponding public key. In this paper, we introduce a new cryptographic technique for mixnet design that we call universal reencryption. As with standard re-encryption, universal re-encryption transforms a ciphertext such that it is unrecognizable by an adversary. It is also key oblivious: the operation neither requires knowledge of nor gives knowledge of what public key is used. When applied to mix networks, this new type of re-encryption technique o ers new and interesting functionality.
Applications and considerations
As we show in this paper, universal re-encryption permits the construction of mix networks with a new range of properties. We rst consider mix networks designed to establish externally anonymous channels. Such mix networks enable two players to hide their communications amid those of a collection of other players, thereby concealing information permitting tra c-analysis. Previously proposed mix network architectures for this purpose associate one or more public keys with the mix network, and require (in most instances) the corresponding private keys to be distributed among the set of participating servers. We describe a mix network based on universal re-encryption in which neither of these things is necessary. In particular, it is possible for such a universal mix network to process ciphertexts encrypted under public keys held by the communicating players, rather than the servers in the mix network. Thus, public and private keys are managed exclusively by the players providing input ciphertexts and receiving output ciphertexts from the mix.
One bene t of a universal mixnet is therefore that it dispenses with the issues of key generation, distribution, and sharing. In consequence, the mix network can be rapidly recon gured: Servers can enter and leave arbitrarily, even in the middle of a round of processing. Moreover, there are no concerns about compromise of keys in a universal mix. Such a mixnet thus provides perfect forward anonymity. 1 In contrast to a standard mixnet, a universal mixnet is such that even if all mix servers become corrupted, the anonymity of previously mixed batches is preserved. A useful feature we get for free is that of an anonymous return channel: If a party wishes to allow people to respond anonymously to a message, he simply attaches an encryption of the value 1 using his own public key to the message. Knowledge of this ciphertext does not give any knowledge of the public key in question, but allows { as we will show { parties to respond to the rst message. Given the inability to determine what messages are for whom { or even what keys they are encrypted with { automatically allows a practical construction of a return channel in which responses cannot be distinguished from other messages.
We also show how to construct an e cient hybrid universal mixnet, that is, one that may e ciently process long input ciphertexts. While the decryption e ort remains linear, it is not necessary for a user to process more than a small portion of the ciphertext in order to determine whether the message is for him or not. We also show how to use a universal mix network instead of an anonymizing bulletin board, and compare the bene ts and drawbacks of our approach to known approaches.
A second application of universal re-encryption is anonymization of radio-frequency identi cation (RFID) tags. An RFID tag is a small device that is used to locate and identify physical objects. It has very limited processing ability (insu cient to perform any re-encryption of data), but allows devices to read and write to its memory, where communication is done by means of radio, and power often is obtained by induction. Examples of uses of RFID tags include the theft-detection tags attached to consumer items in stores and the plaques mounted on car windshields for automated toll payment. Due to its low projected costs, RFID tags are likely to be used in bank notes and general consumer items within the near future. A consequence of this is an emerging privacy threat: An adversary with control of a large base of readers may be able to track the movement of RFID-tagenabled objects, and hence their possessors. In order to avoid tracking of RFID tags, one could let some set of (honest but curious) servers perform re-encryption of the publicly readable information of RFID tags. Given that device movements would replace the use of permutation of ciphertexts, the resulting system is surprisingly similar to a mix network. However, a traditional mix network would not address the tracking problem in its entirety. The reason is that in order to enable the appropriate (and supposedly independent) authorities to decrypt RFID information, we need to use di erent public keys for encryption of information for the relevant authorities. While this is possible using a set of traditional mix networks (adapted to the setting of RFID tags), this would necessitate the public keys associated with the di erent RFID tags to be readable { this in itself will allow a certain degree of tracking, and be aggrevated if a user carries a collection of such tags. These are problems that would be avoided in their entirety if universal encryption techniques were employed. Thus, universal re-encryption o ers heightened privacy in this setting by permitting agents to perform re-encryption without knowledge of public keys, i.e., by merit of the fact that it is key-oblivious. While there have been previous designs using mixes for the purposes of privacy protection for low-power devices (e.g., 32]), universal re-encryption permits signi cant protocol and management simpli cation.
The chief drawback of universal mixnets is the overhead that they impose on receivers. Because the public keys corresponding to individual output ciphertexts are unknown, it may be necessary for a receiver to attempt to decrypt each output ciphertext in order to nd the right one, i.e., the ciphertext corresponding to her private key. Thus, a universal mixnet imposes an overhead on receivers that is linear in the input batch size.
We present in this paper a public-key cryptosystem with universal re-encryption that may be based on the ElGamal cryptosystem implemented over any suitable algebraic group. The basic idea is simple: We append to a standard ElGamal ciphertext a second ciphertext on the identity element. By exploiting the algebraic homomorphism of ElGamal, we can use the second ciphertext to alter the encryption factor in the rst ciphertext. As a result, we can dispense with the need for knowledge of the public key in the re-encryption operation. This construction is half as e cient as standard ElGamal, that is, it requires exactly twice as much storage, and also twice as much computation for encryption, re-encryption, and decryption. Thus the mixnet constructions we propose in this paper are eminently practical.
To give some avor of the issues that our techniques give rise to, let us brie y enumerate the pros and cons of our rst proposed application, universal mixing, in comparison with traditional mixnet constructions.
+ The absence of a shared key means that universal mixes o er perfect forward-anonymity as long as servers do not store the permutations or re-encryption factors they used to process their inputs. In contrast, if the keying material of a standard mix is revealed, an adversary with transcripts from previous mix sessions can compromise their anonymity. + A universal mixnet operates without keys and thus dispenses with the distributed key generation algorithm necessary to set up a traditional re-encryption mixnet. This allows a universal mixnet to be set up more e ciently and with greater exibility. Universal mix servers can be recruited even after the inputs to the mix have been posted, and need not go through any setup. A mix server that crashes or otherwise disappears in the midst of the mixing process can thus easily be replaced by another server. + A universal mix permutes and re-encrypts its inputs, but leaves the task of decrypting the outputs to the receivers. As we will show, this makes it possible to interleave the submission, mixing and retrieval of inputs and results in a new application, the lowvolume anonymous email system, that would not be possible with a traditional mix. The corresponding drawbacks are as follows:
{ The ip-side of perfect forward-anonymity is that is that it is not possible to escrow the privacy o ered by a universal mixnet in a straightforward fashion. Escrow is only achievable in a universal mix as long as every server involved in the mixing remembers how it permuted its inputs and is willing to reveal that permutation. Thus, escrowing cannot, by its very nature, be combined with forward-anonymity. This is a drawback from the perspective of law enforcement. In comparison, escrow is possible in a traditional mix, provided that the shared key can be reconstructed. This requires the participation of only a quorum of servers, not all of them.
{ Recipients must try to decrypt every output of a universal mix to search for those addressed to them. A universal mix thus imposes an overhead on receivers that is linear in the number of outputs.
{ A mixnet based on universal re-encryption provides only external anonymity, as explained above. It does not provide anonymity for senders with respect to receivers. In particular, since a universal mixnet involves encryption of ciphertexts under the public keys of receivers, a given receiver can trace a message intended for her throughout the mixing process. In consequence, she can identify any ciphertexts posted for her consumption. If ciphertexts are not posted anonymously, this means that the receiver can identify the players who have posted messages for her. In contrast, in a traditional mixnet, the recipient cannot identify which of the input ciphertexts she ultimately receives. This restriction to external anonymity is of little consequence for the applications we focus on, namely protection against tra c analysis, but should be borne in mind for other applications.
Organization
We begin by describing the related work in section 1.2, followed by a formal de nition of semantic security for universal re-encryption in section 2. In section 3, we introduce our proposal for creating a public-key cryptosystem with universal re-encryption based on ElGamal, and detail our proposed applications of this building block in the construction of an asymmetric universal mixnet. In section 4, we describe a hybrid of universal re-encryption and symmetric encryption that permits greater e ciency in retrieval when messages are long. We end in section 5 with a discussion of the e ciency of universal mixing.
A Mix Network Taxonomy
Abstractly speaking, a mix network is a privacy primitive that prevents tra c analysis by means of random re-orderings of elements. Proposed by Chaum 6] A mix network provides security by \hiding ciphertexts among ciphertexts". Thus, anonymity increases with the number of input ciphertexts that an output of the mix network could have corresponded to. One can consider both decryption mixes and re-encryption mixes, where the former converts input ciphertexts to plaintexts when mixing, while no such transformation takes place for the latter type. Our focus in this paper, as already explained, is on the latter type.
Encryption type. Another way of categorizing the functionality of mix networks is with respect to the format of the input ciphertexts. Two basic ciphertext formats are considered in the literature: asymmetric and hybrid, i.e., a combination of asymmetric and symmetric encipherment. The earliest proposals, e.g., 6], were largely indi erent to the choice between asymmetric and hybrid ciphertexts, because they did not seek to achieve the property of correctness or robustness. After much of the academic stress was placed on these two properties, most published proposals have been of the asymmetric type, with some recent exceptions 28, 21] . Among practitioners, hybrid (non-robust) mix networks are prevalent, due to their practicality in processing long inputs, like e-mail messages. See 25, 36, 33, 5] for examples. It should be noted that an important requirement for hybrid mixnets is that inputs be of identical size: Di erring message lengths permit an adversary to distinguish among messages in the mixnet. Homogeneity in length may be achieved straightforwardly through padding. As mentioned above, we show how to construct both asymmetric and hybrid universal mixes.
Correctness and robustness. Since the rst mix networks were proposed 6, 29], a variety of schemes and properties have been introduced. One of the most relevant properties for a mix network is that of correctness, namely the assurance that inputs are not tampered with by servers so as to alter their underlying plaintexts. Correctness may be universally veri able 27, 2, 1, 19, 26, 14, 22] meaning that the correctness of the output with respect to the input may be checked by any player, whether or not a participant in the mixing process. Alternatively, the correctness guarantees may rely on honest behavior by a majority of mix servers. Examples of this type of robustness can be found in 17, 18, 10, 24] . It is possible to achieve universal veri ability in the asymmetric universal mixnet that we describe in this paper. Our hybrid universal mixnet, in contrast, relies on honest mix servers.
A property related very closely to that of correctness, and generally addressed by the same literature, is that of robustness. This is the assurance that the mixnet will run to completion even in the presence of a minority of faulty (and possibly corrupt servers). Given that a universal mixnet does not involve distribution of private keying material, it is robust in a strongest possible sense for a mixnet. Provided that at least one server is active, then the mixnet will run to completion in the presence of failures or of faults induced by a passive adversary. (At least two servers are required, however, to achieve privacy in this model.) As usual in distributed security protocols, it is assumed that an active attacker that corrupts a majority of servers can e ectively terminate the protocol.
Knowledge of secret keys. Still another way to classify mix schemes is depending on what type of secret data the mix servers need to be in possession of, and how the mixing is performed. The rst proposed mixnet scheme 6] operated on ciphertext elements that were constructed by iterated encryption using the public keys of the respective servers. Similarly, hybrid mix proposals use iterated symmetric encryption, with keys that are transported using public key techniques. In schemes of both of these types, it is natural to assume the use of multiple public keys, one for each layer of encryption. These keys may either be held by the corresponding servers (as in 6, 28]), or distributed among them (as in 21]). The bulk of other proposed schemes involve re-encryption mixnets. This is to say that input ciphertexts are constructed under a single public key PK for the mixnet. Servers then reencrypt and permute the ciphertexts, generally without knowledge of the corresponding private key. The output ciphertexts must ultimately, however, be decrypted by the player or players holding the private key correpsonding to PK. Our universal mixnet di ers from these constructions, as explained, in that it relies on individual public keys for receiving players, who are themselves responsible for performing the decryption operation.
Security guarantees. Another important goal, of course, should be that of obtaining some form of provability of the properties promised by a mixnet, namely privacy and correctness. This is emphasized by the record of aws of mix schemes, see e.g., 3, 10, 24, 31, 30] . While the broken schemes have often also been xed in the same breath, the lack of common de nitions and proof methodology suggests that even the repaired schemes, and schemes with no known aws, may be vulnerable. In the absence of a good model and methodology for mix network design, this speaks in favor of simple and straightforward designs using well understood building blocks. This principle motivates our proposals in this paper.
De nitions
A conventional randomized public-key cryptosystem comprises a triple of algorithms, CS = (KG; E; D), for key generation, encryption, and decryption respectively. We assume, as is often the case for discrete-log-based cryptosystems, that system parameters and underlying algebraic structures for CS are published in advance by a trusted party. These are generated according to a common security parameter k. System parameters include or imply speci cations of M, C, and R { respectively a message space, ciphertext space, and set of encryption factors. In more detail: { The key-generation algorithm (P K; SK) KG outputs a random key pair. { The encryption algorithm C E(PK; m; r) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a public key PK, a message m 2 M , and an encryption factor r 2 R, and outputs a ciphertext C 2 C. { The decryption algorithm m D(SK; C) takes as input a private key SK and ciphertext C 2 C and outputs the corresponding plaintext.
A critical security property for providing privacy in a mix network is that of semantic security. Loosely speaking, this property stipulates the infeasibility of learning any information at all about a plaintext from a corresponding ciphertext 15]. For a more formal de nition, we consider an adversary that is given a public key PK, where (P K; SK) KG. This adversary chooses a pair (m 0 ; m 1 ) of plaintexts. Corresponding ciphertexts (C 0 ; C 1 ) = (E(P K; m 0 ; r 0 ); E(PK; m 1 ; r 1 )) for r 0 ; r 1 2 U R are computed, where 2 U denotes uniform, random selection. For a random bit b, the adversary is furnished with the pair (C b ; C 1?b ), and tries to guess b. The cryptosystem CS is said to be semantically secure if the adversary can guess b with advantage at most negligible in k, i.e., with probability at most negligibly larger than 1=2.
For a re-encryption mix network, an additional component known as a re-encryption algorithm, denoted by Re, is required in CS. This algorithm e ectively re-randomizes the encryption factor in a ciphertext. In a standard cryptosystem, this means that C 0
Re(C; r; PK) for C; C 0 2 C; r 2 R, and a public key PK. Observe that re-encryption, in contrast to encryption, may be executed without knowledge of a plaintext. The notion of semantic security may be naturally extended to apply to the re-encryption operation by considering an adversary that chooses ciphertexts (C 0 ; C 1 ) under PK. The property of semantic security under re-encryption, then, means this: Given respective re-encryptions (C 0 b ; C 0 1?b ) in a random order, the adversary cannot guess b with non-negligible advantage in k. Provided that Re yields the same distribution of ciphertexts as E for (given r 2 U R) or that the two distributions are indistinguishable, it may be seen that basic semantic security implies semantic security under re-encryption. As already explained, a universal cryptosystem permits re-encryption without knowledge of the public key corresponding to a given ciphertext. Let us denote such a cryptosystem by UCS = (UKG; UE; URe; UD), where UKG; UE; and UD are key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms. These are de ned as in a standard cryptosystem. The di erence between a universal cryptosystem UCS and a standard cryptosystem resides in the reencryption algorithm URe. In particular, URe here takes as input a ciphertext C and reencryption factor r, but no public key PK. Thus, we have C 0 URe(C; r) for C; C 0 2 C, r 2 R.
To de ne universal semantic security under re-encryption, i.e., with respect to URe, it is necessary to consider an adversarial experiment that is a variant on the standard one for semantic security. In particular, we de ne an experiment uss as follows for a (stateful) adversarial algorithm A. This experiment terminates on issuing an output bit. As above, we assume an appropriate implicit parameterization of UCS under security parameter k. The idea behind the experiment is as follows. The adversary is permitted to construct universal ciphertexts under two randomly generated keys, PK 0 and PK 1 . These ciphertexts are then re-encrypted. The aim of the adversary is to distinguish between the two re-encryptions.
Our aim in construction UCS is for the adversary to be unable to do so with more than negligible probability. We say that UCS is semantically secure under re-encryption if for any adversary A with resources polynomial in K, the probability pr Exp uss A (UCS; k) =`1'] ? 1=2 is negligible in k.
The experiment uss captures the idea that the keys associated with ciphertexts are concealed by the re-encryption process in UCS. Thus, even an adversary with the opportunity to compose the ciphertexts undergoing re-encryption cannot make use of di erences in public keys in order to defeat the semantic security of the cryptosystem. Observe that the ciphertext size and the computational costs for all algorithms are exactly twice those of the basic ElGamal cryptosystem. The properties of standard semantic security and also universal semantic security under re-encryption (as characterized by experiment uss) may be shown straightforwardly to be reducible to the Decision Di e-Hellman (DDH) 
Universal Mix Network
Recall that the application we have in mind for universal mixing is the enforcement of external anonymity in communication among players. In other words, we consider a number of senders who want to send messages to some recipients in such a way that communication between a particular sender and recipient is hidden from everyone but the sender and recipient. We assume that every recipient has an ElGamal private/public key pair (x; y = g x )
in the group G. We also assume that every sender knows the public key of all the receivers with whom it intends to communicate, or has a \blank" ciphertext for this party (this is an encryption using UE of the identity element in G under the public key of the recipient.)
The communication protocol proceeds as follows: who doesn't know the corresponding private keys, given our assumption that DDH is hard in the group G. 2. Universal mixing. Any server can be called upon to mix the contents of the bulletin board. A mixing operation consists of re-encrypting all the universal ciphertexts on the bulletin board using URe and writing the resulting new ciphertexts back to the bulletin board in random order. Recall that a re-encryption of a universal ciphertext produces a new universal ciphertext that corresponds to an encryption of the same plaintext under the same public key. It is also desirable that a server that mixes the inputs can prove that it operated correctly. This can be done using a number of existing schemes, e.g. 22, 26, 14] , and will be discussed in greater detail below.
3. Retrieval of the outputs. Potential recipients must try to decrypt every encrypted message output by the universal mixnet. Successful decryptions correspond to messages that were intended for that recipient. The others (corresponding to decryption output ? 0 are discarded by the party attempting to perform the decryption. Low-volume anonymous messaging application.
For simplicity, we have described above the operation of a universal mixnet in which inputs are submitted, mixed and nally retrieved. This sequence of events is characteristic of all mixes. Unlike regular mixes however, universal mixes allow for repeated interleaving of the submission, mixing and retrieval steps. What makes this possible is that the decryption is performed by the recipients of the message rather than by the mixnet, so that existing messages posted to the bulletin board are at all times indistinguishable from new messages. New inputs may be constantly added to the existing content of the bulletin board, and outputs retrieved, provided there is at least one round of mixing between every submission and retrieval to ensure privacy.
This suggests a generalization of the private communication protocol described above, in which the bulletin board maintains at all times a pool of unclaimed messages. Senders may add messages and receivers retrieve them at any time, provided there is always at least one round of mixing between each posting and retrieval. This protocol appears well suited to guarantee anonymity from external observers in a system in which few messages are exchanged. The privacy of the protocol relies on the existence of a steady pool of undelivered messages rather than on a constant ow of new messages. The former condition appears much easier to satisfy than the latter in cases when the total number of messages that are exchanged is small. We thus obtain the greater anonymity protection of a pool mix, but without the usual limitation of unveri ability of correct performance by the mixes 2 .
Universal Mixing vs. Anonymizing Bulletin Board.
A universal mix network can be used to implement an anonymizing bulletin board. While all the contents of an anonymizing bulletin board have to be downloaded, a construction based on a universal mix allows a party to stop downloading messages once he has found the message for him (assuming he knows there is only one.) It is possible for a recipient to remove messages for him in our system 3 assuming this does not allow an attacker to perform timing attacks (this is an application dependent issue). Alternatively, the mix network may remove and archive all messages of a certain age. Old and new messages are indistinguishable after a single universal re-encryption and mixing. Archiving is still possible, but this makes it more subtle. Such issues are beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, and as will be described in the next section, only parts of messages have to be downloaded to allow a recipient to determine what messages are for him.
RFID-privacy.
The same basic design principles presented above may be applied to privacy-enhancement for RFID tags. There are some critical di erences in the scenario where players carry ciphertexts in RFID tags, rather than posting them to a bulletin board. As re-encryption naturally occurs for tags in this case on an individual basis, the underlying mixnet may be regarded as asynchronous. There is also a special security consideration in this setting. Suppose that the ciphertext on an RFID tag is of the form ( ; ); (1; 1) (where '1' representing the identity element for G). Then the ciphertext on the tag will not change upon re-encryption. Thus, it is important to prevent an active adversary from inserting such a ciphertext on an RFID 2 A pool mix typically uses processing delays in asynchronous mixes to hide timing information. They were rst described by Lance Cottrell in the nineties 8]. See 35] for a further discussion of pool mixes, and 12] for an approach to verifying correct functioning of pool mixes tag so as to be able to trace it and undermine the privacy of the possessor. In particular, re-encryption agents on processing ciphertexts should check that they do not assume this degenerate form. Of course, an adversary in this environment can always corrupt ciphertexts.
Note, however, that even a corrupted ciphertext ( 0 ; 0 ); ( ; ), however, will be rendered unrecognizable to an adversary provided that ; 6 = 1. The same technique can be applied to other applications where standard robustness mechanisms are impractical or not applicable.
Security
We do not undertake a formal analysis of the security of our proposed construction in this paper. Instead, we con ne ourselves to remarks on the properties of privacy and correctness.
Correctness. The correctness of the output of our mixnet construction depends on the way that participating servers prove that they have behaved honestly. For this, it is possible to draw on essentially any of the proof techniques presented in the literature on mixnets, as nearly all apply to El Gamal ciphertexts. For example, to achieve universal veri ability, it is possible to employ the proof techniques in 14, 26, 22] . A small technical consideration, which may be dealt with straightforwardly, is the form of input ciphertexts. Input ciphertexts in most mix network constructions consist of a single El Gamal ciphertext, while in our construction, an input consists of a universal ciphertext, and thus two related El Gamal ciphertexts. (As already explained above, our construction achieves the strongest possible assurance for the related property of robustness.)
Hybrid universal mixing
We describe next a variant mixnet called a hybrid universal mixnet. This type of mixnet combines symmetric and public-key encryption to accommodate potentially very long messages (all of the same size) in an e cient manner. We refer the interested reader to 28, 21] for de nitions and examples of hybrid mixnets. Our de nition of a universal hybrid mix considers a weaker threat model than above with respect to correctness. Our universal hybrid mix cannot be veri ed to correctly execute the protocol because of the use we make of symmetric encryption. Thus, we restrict our security model to mix servers subject only to passive adversarial corruption. Such servers are also known as honest-but-curious. They follow the protocol correctly but try to learn as much information as possible from its execution.
For e ciency, inputs m are submitted to a hybrid mix encrypted under an initial symmetric (rather than public) key. We denote by k m] the symmetric-key encryption of m under key k. Each mix server S i consecutively re-encrypts the output of the previous mix under a new random symmetric key k i . If there are k mix servers, the nal output of the mix is therefore kn k n?1 : : : k 1 k m]] : : :]. The symmetric keys k; k 1 ; : : : ; k n must be conveyed alongside the encrypted message to enable decryption by the nal recipient. Thus, these keys are themselves encrypted as universal ciphertexts under the public key of the recipient.
Universal encryption provides a very e cient way of transmitting encryptions of the symmetric keys in a way that does not compromise privacy.
Let us now give a more detailed de nition of our hybrid universal mixnet. Our construction imposes an upper bound n on the maximum number of times that the mixing operation is performed by the mixnet on any given ciphertext. The protocol consists of the following steps: When it has thus processed all its inputs in this manner, the server outputs them back to the bulletin board in a random order. where fE 1]g n?d denotes n?d El Gamal ciphertexts on the identity element. As before, recipients try to decrypt every output of the mixnet and discard those outputs for which the decryption fails. However, only the second element, E 1], has to be decrypted in order for a party to determine whether the ciphertext is for him.
Remark: In principle, it is possible to use the \blank" ciphertext E 1] to append ciphertexts on as many symmetric keys as desired, and thus re-encrypt inde nitely. The reason for restricting the number of \blank" ciphertext to exactly n is to preserve a uniform length, without which an adversary can distinguish among ciphertexts. A drawback of this approach is that a ciphertext re-encrypted more than n times will become undecipherable by the receiver. Since undecipherable messages would not be picked up by anybody, this is a substantial drawback; a better alternative would be to remove and archive ciphertexts that have been re-encrypted n times.
E ciency discussion
The inputs to a universal mix consist of a pair of ElGamal ciphertexts, which doubles the computational cost of re-encrypting the inputs as well as verifying the correctness of re-encryptions. On the other hand, a universal mix leaves the task of decrypting to the recipients and thus saves the mix servers the cost of decryption and proof of correct decryption. The total computational cost of a universal mix depends on the technique used to verify correctness, as shown in Fig. 5 . For example, compared to the techniques used in 22] to prove correctness, we estimate that a universal mix saves (2 + 3k)n exponentiations per server, where k is the total number of servers and n the number of inputs being mixed. 
